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THE PERFECT OPINION 
ANDREW JENSEN KERR* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In my Article, "The Perfect Opinion," I collate favorite judicial 
opinions to inductively derive an archetype of perfection. The question of 
which opinions we like the most is decidedly subjective, but it also reveals 
implied preferences for creative judging that might not register on citation 
counts or be prioritized when editing casebooks. Importantly, our choice 
of a favorite reflects something about us. So why do judges often select 
non-authoritative opinions (alternative concurrences or dissents) or no-
citation opinions (that don’t cite to prior case law) when asked of their 
favorite opinion? We might predict that most judges would select, for 
example, a Justice Cardozo majority opinion that deftly marshals a wide 
swath of precedent to justify a remarkable turn in the doctrine. 
Instead, it seems that at least some judges share a critical perspective 
that citation is a masking device, and regard over-citation with caution. 
Despite innovative thinking from academics like Frederick Schauer on the 
nature and use of authority, this topic remains under-theorized. I 
contribute to this literature by making a novel observation about implicit 
authority. Judges who rely on principled reasoning are making both an 
empirical claim that these principles inform our positive law, and a 
normative claim that these principles are in fact a better reflection of our 
law than the “ordinary legal materials” (case law, etc.) we typically work 
with. This intellectual move requires tacit knowledge and feel, and so it’s 
not surprising these opinions write so effortlessly. These above-great 
opinions together limn an archetype of perfection that we can use as an 
ideal form. Not surprisingly, this theorizing echoes the work of Ronald 
Dworkin, who built his own normative theory of perfection in the construct 
of Hercules. None of us can be him. But perhaps one of our own has 
enjoyed the herculean moment. This Article searches for it. 
 
 
  *  Lecturer of Legal English and S.J.D. Candidate, Georgetown Law. I thank Robin West, 
Greg Klass, Liron Shilo and Rafi Reznik for their help with this paper. I am also grateful for the 
feedback that I received at the Law, Culture and the Humanities 2019 Annual Conference and from the 
faculty workshop at Thammasat University, especially from commentators Andrew Harding, 
Phattharaphong Saengkrai and Korrasut Khopuangklang. 
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It is strange, indeed, that a law containing such important 
principles, should be the only one that has never appeared in print. 
Under these circumstances, to infer a law, as is proposed, would 
seem to me to savor too much of giving a forced construction to 
sustain a favorite and preconceived opinion, or to enable us to get 
over a hard case.1 
—  Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnson, (1828). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article searches for the perfect judicial opinion. Other writers 
have had similar ambitions: to catalog the best opinions,2 to discern the 
most important opinions,3 or to rank judges by quality.4 These 
determinations inhere a measure of subjectivity, and perhaps involve 
difficult epistemological questions of aesthetics and taste. Judicial writing 
is certainly a craft, and our favorite opinions are written with a style that 
makes them impactful beyond the mere reasoning and logic they contain.5 
To avoid these subjective aesthetic judgments, other greatness-seeking 
authors have used objective data like casebook content or citation counts 
to quantify notions of canon or import. For example, Professors Cross and 
Spriggs employed sophisticated quantitative and network analyses of 
citations in their 2010 study, “The Most Important (and Best) Supreme 
Court Opinions and Justices.”6 Judge Posner also considered citation 
counts in his elegant work on connections between judicial quality and 
reputation, Cardozo: A Study of Reputation.7 It makes sense to use citation 
as evidence of greatness, especially in a common law system like the 
United States where the value of a case reference depends in part on the 
credibility of its judge-author. Implied preferences in judicial quality and 
impactful writing are each revealed in the decision to cite. We can also see 
citations; we can count them. This makes citation a very useful heuristic 
 
 
 1. Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnston, 3 Ohio 553, 558 (1828). 
 2. E.g., Ross Guberman, POINT TAKEN: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE WORLD’S BEST JUDGES 
(2015). 
 3. E.g., Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court 
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407 (2010). 
 4.  E.g., Robert Anderson, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Quality in 
the United States Court of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315 (2010). 
 5.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1421, 1422 (1995) (taking a “stab” at defining style as “what is left out by paraphrase”). 
 6.  Cross & Spriggs, supra note 3. 
 7.  RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 69-70 (rev. ed. 1993) [hereinafter 
A STUDY IN REPUTATION]. 
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for comparing judicial opinions, whereas aesthetic criteria are notoriously 
difficult to articulate and measure. 
This Article does not contest the sensitive use of citation as a measure 
for quality. And it does not even disagree with the usual lists of great 
judges, or the usual advice on what makes for great judicial writing. 
Instead I remind the reader that there is another layer of quality above the 
merely great opinion. First, I disclaim that I fully understand why most 
judges should aim for competence. Scarce administrative resources, docket 
management, fear of overrule – these are just a few of the very reasonable 
concerns that might motivate a judge to craft the competent, if 
occasionally great, opinion, marked by careful use of citation and a 
reasoned, effable basis for its holding.8  
 But exploring and unpacking this beyond-great tranche of opinion is 
not simply an indulgent, academic exercise. I argue that there are 
important jurisprudential insights that come with searching for perfection, 
insights which seem to subvert our most core beliefs about judicial writing 
in a common law system. These opinions are often non-authoritative 
concurrences and dissents, and, even stranger, they sometimes don’t cite to 
authority at all. What are judges doing when they don’t resort to authority? 
What does it mean for our profession if our favorite opinions, the ones we 
like the most, are crafted in a way that deliberately ignores the rudiments 
of legal writing? Does this mean that all judges should write with 
perfection in mind? If not, who should and when should they? 
This Article collates favorite opinions to inductively derive an 
archetype of perfection. The question of which opinions we like most is 
decidedly subjective and personal, but it also captures implied preferences 
for creative and erudite judging that might not register on aggregative 
citation counts or be prioritized when editing didactic casebooks meant to 
prepare students for the work of lawyering. I limit my search by looking 
mainly at our favorite judges, but I also catalog a handful of favorite 
scholars and stylists. And, as will become clear, my data set is further 
limited by the fact that the question of favorites is rarely asked by 
 
 
  8.  Cf. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the 
Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 406-07 (1994) [hereinafter Publish and Perish] (commenting 
on how increased writing burdens have transformed judges “from thinkers to managers”); see also 
Chad Oldfather, Of Umpires, Judges and Metaphors: Adjudication in Aesthetic Sports and its 
Implications for Law, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 271(2014) [hereinafter Adjudication in Aesthetic 
Sports]. 
Ours is a world that tends to discount that which cannot be easily identified, and one in which 
judges were long ago deprived of the ability to engage in the sort of leisurely consideration of 
their cases that the notion of judge-as-craftsperson suggests. Yet while the circumstances in 
which judges operate have changed, the need to rely on tacit knowledge to do the job has not. 
Id. at 294.  
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commentators or answered directly by judges or academics. One 
wonderful exception is Blackie the Talking Cat: And other favorite 
judicial opinions,9 which should already be on your bookshelf or coffee 
table. But this book is also made up disproportionately of “fun” opinions.10 
I have delimited those, and other similarly fun opinions, as outside the 
scope of this project. At its core, this is not an empirical contribution but 
an analysis of the surprising correlation of favorite opinions with non-
authoritative/no-citation opinions. Favorite opinions are non-
authoritative/no-citation opinions often enough to be significant.  
This is also a topical project. Youngstown Steel is again relevant as the 
U.S. Congress voted in Spring 2019 to express disapproval of President 
Trump’s plan to direct federal money to constructing the southern border 
wall.11 If the U.S. Supreme Court ever considers the constitutionality12 of 
his decision, President Trump will hope his appointment, Justice 
Kavanaugh, affirms his executive power to declare a national emergency. 
But on Kavanaugh’s mind will be the Youngstown Steel precedent, which 
he declared during his confirmation proceedings to be one of “the four 
greatest Supreme Court cases in history.”13 Kavanaugh did not specify 
whether he was referring to the Black majority opinion or the Jackson 
concurrence. Black’s opinion might be critiqued as unimaginative and 
reductive.14 However, he successfully defended America’s coordinate 
 
 
  9.  BLACKIE THE TALKING CAT: AND OTHER FAVORITE JUDICIAL OPINIONS (Ed. West 
Publishing) (1996). 
  10.  But see Kent C. Olson, Those Who Play with Cats, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 217, 218 (1998) (“But 
focusing simply on humor, or the deficiency thereof, sells Blackie short. The preface indicates that 
there is more here than wit.”). 
  11.  E.g., Jay Michaelson, It’s Up to Chief Justice John Roberts to Stop Trump’s Border Wall, 
THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/its-up-to-chief-justice-john-
roberts-to-stop-trumps-border-wall [https://perma.cc/3HDT-JHZD]. 
  12.  In July 2019 the U.S. Supreme Court voted 5-4 to permit President Trump to move forward 
with the construction of the border wall using Defense Department funds. The summary decision 
seems more responsive to the identities of the plaintiff organizations (the ACLU, Sierra Club, and 
Southern Border Communities Coalition) and the possibility of irreparable environmental harm. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019); see also Jessica Greko, Supreme Court: Trump can use 
Pentagon funds for border wall, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 27, 2019). 
  13.  E.g., Brenda J. Linert, Local steel case important to Kavanaugh, TRIBUNE CHRONICLE 
(Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.tribtoday.com/opinion/editorsdesk/2018/10/local-steel-case-important-to-
kavanaugh/ (quoting Senator Susan Collins).  
Judge Kavanaugh has been unequivocal in his belief that no president is above the law. He 
has stated that Marbury v. Madison; Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer; and United States v. Nixon 
are three of the four greatest Supreme Court cases in history,” Collins said on the Senate 
floor. “What do they have in common? Each of them is a case where the Court served as a 
check on presidential power. 
Id. 
  14.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that the separation of powers issues in this case are “more complicated and 
flexible” than portrayed by Justice Black’s majority opinion). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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system of government and affirmed Congress’ lawmaking powers under 
Article I.15 This holding – and the courage to make it during the Korean 
War effort – make it an important decision. 
But Kavanaugh was likely thinking of the iconic concurrence from 
Robert Jackson.16 Jackson drew on his unique political pedigree to craft a 
supremely learned and elegant opinion on the nature of executive power in 
an evolving world. Jackson outlined a now famous three-tiered matrix to 
identify how the President’s Article II powers might combine or compete 
with Congressional authority.17 With Congress’ vote of disapproval of the 
border wall, Trump is at his “lowest ebb” of power, at least according to 
Justice Jackson, and perhaps to Justice Kavanaugh as well. 
Justice Jackson’s opinion reflects his mastery of constitutional design. 
But for Professor Sanford Levinson, the Jackson concurrence is more 
special for its authorial approach than its substantive content. For 
Professor Levinson, the Youngstown concurrence is not just a great 
opinion but is his favorite opinion, because it represents the “best 
example” of a “self-consciously postrealist encounter with the nature of 
legal argument.” According to Levinson, Jackson, during this reflective 
process, accurately assessed “the [in]sufficiency of ordinary legal 
materials” to manage President Truman’s steel seizure plans and instead 
relied on “logic” and “experience” when forming his opinion.18 The 
Jackson concurrence is a favorite opinion because of Jackson’s ability to 
look under the surface data points of case law and recognize the 
unarticulated first principles that animate our way of doing law in the 
United States. It is a brilliant meditation informed by years of legal work 
in national security.19 This first principles approach is evidenced by its 
lack of citation to conventional authority. The Jackson concurrence 
includes zero in-text citations. He includes footnotes containing case law 
support for the scholarly reader. But “above the line” the only precedent-
like cases are European nations’ recent experience with martial law.20 
This lead example illustrates the insight and limits of this Article. I 
might unfairly categorize these beyond-great opinions by clustering 
 
 
  15.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (Black, J., majority opinion). 
  16.  Further evidence that Jackson’s concurrence is the likely “greatest” opinion from 
Youngstown is the space he dedicates to it in his 2008 article, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of 
Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454 (2009). 
  17.  Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 589, 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
  18.  Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Why Select a Favorite Case?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1196, 1197 
(1996). 
  19.  Cf. A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 7, at 140 (“His experience in the upper echelons 
of government lend a resonance to his public-law opinions.”). 
  20.  Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 651-62 (1952) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
2020] THE PERFECT OPINION 227 
 
 
 
 
“greatest” and “favorite” opinions together as a uniform grouping. To 
Kavanaugh, the greatest opinion might differ from his favorite. It is also 
unclear how candid he was being – or could be – in the context of a 
politically saturated confirmation hearing. Announcing a personal 
favorite/great is a way to curate a public identity, as illustrated by the 
billions of social media users who choose to define themselves by their 
discerning taste in food, fashion, sport, music or art, etc. We might not 
always be our most honest selves when we are showing off for others. 
This Article also offers provocative insights. Our choice of favorite 
reflects something about us.21 So why do judges often select non-
authoritative opinions (alternative concurrences or dissents) or no-citation 
opinions (that don’t cite to prior case law) when asked of their favorite 
opinion? We might predict that most judges would select, for example, a 
Cardozo majority opinion that deftly marshals a wide swath of precedent 
to justify a remarkable turn in doctrine.22 Instead, it seems that at least 
some judges share a critical perspective that citation is a “mask hiding 
other considerations”23 and regard over-citation with caution.24 Despite 
innovative thinking from Professor Schauer and, most recently, Amy 
Griffin on the nature and use of authority, this topic remains under-
theorized.25 I contribute to this literature by making a novel observation 
about implicit authority. Judges who rely on principled reasoning are 
making both an empirical claim that these principles inform our positive 
law and a normative claim that these principles are in fact a better 
reflection of our law than the “ordinary legal materials”26 (case law, etc.) 
we typically work with. These intellectual moves require tacit knowledge 
and feel, so it’s not surprising that these opinions write so effortlessly. 
 
 
  21.  Indeed, this is likely why prospective federal judges have been asked to supply a list of 
their favorite opinions as part of their “ideological vetting.” Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 
2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 695, 702 (2003). 
  22.  Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Citations in 
the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 
555 (2010) (citing William H. Manz, Cardozo's Use of Authority: An Empirical Study, 32 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 31, 31 (1995)) (“One early historical study found that Justice Cardozo ‘cited far more authority 
in his opinions’ than did his contemporary judges.”). 
  23.  Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
723, 743 (1988). 
  24.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, et al., supra note 22, at 528 (“If citations are a mask, a Justice 
might choose to employ a large number of citations so as to better hide the true basis for the decision 
behind a blizzard of precedent.”). See also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 1931, 1932 (2008) (“Legal sophisticates these days worry little about the ins and outs of citation, 
tending instead to cast their lot with the legal realists in believing that the citation of legal authorities 
in briefs, arguments, and opinions is scarcely more than a decoration.”). 
  25.  See Griffin, infra note 56 and accompanying discussion; Schauer, infra note 58. 
  26.  Levinson, supra note 18, at 1197. 
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These above-great opinions together limn an archetype of perfection that 
we can use as an ideal form. This theorizing echoes the work of Ronald 
Dworkin, who built his own normative theory of perfection in the 
construct of Hercules.27 None of us can be him. But perhaps one of our 
own has enjoyed the herculean moment. This Article searches for it. 
 I first consider favorite opinions in the context of other judicial 
superlatives and chart our favorite opinions in progressively archetypal 
categories. I quickly discount convention or fun as a model of perfection. 
Instead, I focus on opinions that reason from first principles and 
contextualize my thinking within broader debates about the meaning of 
authority and why judges explain their decisions. I consider several 
potentially perfect opinions in detail, including the overlooked Levesque v. 
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.28 I conclude by questioning the value of 
perfection in a culture that increasingly permits citation to foreign and 
non-legal authorities. 
I. LIKEABILITY, QUALITY, AND CANON 
My working definition for a favorite is something that we like the 
most. To like something means we enjoy it, and we can enjoy things for a 
myriad of reasons. In this way, it is a broad, open-textured word that might 
be criticized as lacking the nicety of definition we generally prefer when 
dealing with jurisprudential problems like discerning the platonic 
manifestation of an ideally formed opinion. “Like” is also an appropriate 
word because of this same core meaning of enjoyment and its connotations 
of sincerity and non-instrumentality. We like something not because we 
are told to or because someone else happens to think it’s important. We 
like it for the thing-in-itself. In a study of superlative judicial opinions, this 
kind of contained analysis is essential. Being asked what our favorite is 
encourages us to select an opinion because of its content separate from its 
consequence. We don’t think about what it stands for but what it is. A 
favorite judicial opinion is not reduced to its holding or made a non-literal 
representation of an adjunct principle that future lawyers or judges have 
equated it with. Choosing a favorite requires us to think about the opinion 
in its materiality, its embodiment and with regard for its craftwork. 
I focus on judges’ favorites. We can assume that judges have read 
many judicial opinions and have special insight into the constraints on 
decision-making. These constraints include the workaday concerns of 
 
 
  27.  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
  28.  Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 (1987). 
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collegiality and compromise in forming an opinion of the court,29 or the 
gravity of crafting a text that imbues the coercive force of the state. A 
judge selects a favorite from shared experience. 
This question of a favorite opinion is adjacent to debates on canonicity 
in the legal academy. We can think of the legal canon as the core group of 
legal texts that are considered essential reading for law students, lawyers, 
judges and/or legal academics. The first rigorous look at the legal canon 
was Professors Balkin and Levinson’s “The Canons of Constitutional 
Law” for the Harvard Law Review.30 An important insight from this article 
is that there are institutional differences that distinguish the legal academy 
from the humanities. Legal academics compete with judges and the bar in 
forming the canon, and law instructors might find it pedagogically 
important to teach inspiring as well as odious cases. Many constitutional 
law professors include Dred Scott v. Sandford in their syllabi for historical 
reasons. Few, if any, English professors would bother to include pulp 
fiction or a novel with Fabio on the cover as an example of what not to do. 
Rather, “[t]he question of what one should teach in English departments is 
very much connected to the questions of […] what the ‘best’ literature is 
(including what literature has the best effects on its readers).”31 
The necessary equation of exemplar and teaching device in literature 
is absent in the context of legal education. Casebook editors instead make 
curatorial decisions to include judicial opinions that reflect a doctrinal 
point in a particularly accessible or memorable way, perhaps even because 
there is something about the judge’s reasoning that appears droll or is 
otherwise amenable to critique. Constitutional law is a bit distinctive as 
compared to the traditional first-year common law subject, and many 
opinions included in a constitutional law text might have special 
pedagogic import beyond the mere doctrinal point they make. 
Constitutional law is also perhaps the most contextual of the first-year 
subjects, and the historical or evolutive value of the selected constitutional 
case has no necessary connection to its quality or likeability. 
Of course, part of our legal canon is still reserved for superlative 
opinions. Anita Krishnakumar observed that the “lionization” of the iconic 
Holmes dissent in Lochner was not concurrent to the constructive overrule 
of the Lochner doctrine in 1938.32 Rather, the first judicial citations to 
 
 
  29.  See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003). 
  30.  J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
963 (1998). 
  31.  Id. at 981 (emphasis added). 
  32.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 
781, 789-90 (2000). 
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Holmes's dissent “did not surface until the late 1940s.”33 This delay 
suggests how the later historical construction of how Holmes’ Lochner 
dissent became a foil to the eponymous Lochner doctrine.34 If there is 
more than one available judicial opinion to illustrate a doctrinal point (that 
“liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include substantive 
freedom to contract) and if we select a dissent as authority long after it 
became potentially authoritative, we can fairly guess that this canonization 
process depends on the style and quality of the selected original dissent. It 
becomes canonic because it is liked for reasons separate from its doctrinal 
argument. To this extent, Krishnakumar’s historical claim helps my own 
cause. After all, Holmes’ Lochner dissent is a favorite jurist’s favorite 
opinion: Judge Posner celebrated it as a “rhetorical masterpiece” in Law 
and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation.35 
II. YOUR FAVORITE JUDGE’S FAVORITE OPINION (IS NOT PERFECT) 
A. The Conventionally Great Opinion 
I identify four categories of favorite opinions, of which my third and 
fourth categories (non-authoritative opinions and majority opinions that 
don't cite to authority) are most important to this Article. The first kind of 
favorite opinion is the conventional majority opinion – it can be 
transformative, it can be courageous, and it cites to case law in justifying 
its argumentative moves. It is perfectly admirable if this sort of favorite is 
your own! You are in the same company as other favorite judges including 
Chief Justice John Roberts and late Justice John Paul Stevens. But it is not 
enough for an opinion to possess moral imagination, have rhetorical might 
and marshal relevant case law to support its conclusions. This makes for a 
great, even very great, opinion, but not one that chases perfection. 
 
 
  33.  Krishnakumar, supra note 32, at 789. 
  34.  Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 248 
(1998). 
  35.  RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 298 (1988). See 
also Primus, supra note 34, at 286 (“[P]erhaps Holmes’s most canonical opinion: the Lochner 
dissent.”). 
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TABLE 1: THE CONVENTIONALLY GREAT OPINION 
Favorite 
Judge 
Favorite Opinion Superlative 
language 
Citations 
Chief Justice 
Roberts 
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 
527 (1995) (Justice Souter) 
“one of his favorite 
opinions” 
(hearsay)36 
many 
Justice Stevens Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hiram Hill et al., 437 U.S. 153 
(1978) (Chief Justice Burger) 
(the “Snail Darter” case) 
multiple references 
to it being “one of 
his favorites”37 
many 
Justice White 
(self-citation) 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
735 (1973) (Justice White) 
“[o]ne of my 
favorite cases”38 
many 
Justice Stewart 
(self-citation) 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 
723 (1963) (Justice Stewart) 
“[m]y favorite 
case”39 
many 
 
 
 
 
 
  36.  Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of Rule-Based Jurisprudence, 46 TULSA 
L. REV. 431, 433 n.14 (2011) (citing Jan Crawford Greenburg, The Gift That Keeps on Giving, Life, 
Politics and the Law (March 31, 2008, 3:51 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/legalities/2008/03/the-gift-
that-k.html (“Roberts has said the case is one of his favorite opinions because of what the Court 
said.”)). 
  37.  Justice Stevens has identified several favorites, but Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
seems to be the only repeat favorite. E.g., Nancy S. Marder, A Dignified, Inside Look at the Supreme 
Court – and More Than a Few Surprises, 95 JUDICATURE 196 (2012); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme 
Court; Recalling Favorite Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1985, at B8, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/03/us/supreme-court-recalling-favorite-decisions.html. 
[https://perma.cc/387U-JHJ8]; see also Justice John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 269, 273 (2005) (referring to his “two favorites” authored by Chief Justice Warren 
Burger as TVA v. Hill and Reed v. Reed). But see Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), Gerald R. Ford 
Presidential Foundation 2011 William E. Simon Lecture in Public Affairs, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2012) (referring to “one of his favorites” being Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
  38.  Taylor, supra note 37, at B8. 
  39.  Id. 
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B. Fun Opinions 
The second category of favorite opinion is the fun opinion. It can 
possess charm or whimsy. It may be a case where the judge is handed a 
remarkable fact pattern, “such as a man suing the devil or himself.”40 It is 
Blackie the Talking Cat41 and its ilk. I also include here opinions selected 
by our favorite judges because the substance of the case was uniquely 
suited to the idiosyncratic preferences of the judge-author. For example, 
Justice Blackmun loved baseball (Flood v. Kuhn), and Justice Rehnquist 
loved trains (Leo Sheep).42 These were fun to write, and this enthusiasm 
often manifests in the quality of the opinion. These are great in all sorts of 
varied ways, but they don’t chase perfection.  
 
 
 
  40.  Olson, supra note 10, at 218. 
  41.  Miles v. City Council of Augusta, Ga., 710 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1983). 
  42.  E.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Hidden Legacy of Holy Trinity Church: The Unique 
National Institution Canon, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1053, 1108 (2009). 
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TABLE 2: FUN OPINIONS 
Favorite Judge Favorite Opinion Superlative 
language 
Citations 
Justice 
Blackmun (self-
citation) 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972) (Justice Blackmun; 
majority) 
“favorite”43 many 
Justice Rehnquist 
(self-citation) 
Leo Sheep Company v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (Justice 
Rehnquist; opinion of the court) 
“a case I enjoyed 
writing as much as 
any”44 
many 
Justice O’Connor Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure 
Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) 
(joined Justice White’s partial 
concurrence/partial dissent) 
“particularly fond of” 
this “most unusual 
and interesting” 
case45 
many 
Judge Robert 
Brown (sundry 
self-citations) 
Favorited many of his own 
“colorful opinions,” including 
Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Cent. 
Am. Beef & Seafood Trading Co., 
621 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1980) 
“I received a batch of 
his favorite opinions” 
(hearsay, but from a 
former clerk)46 
many 
Judge Gerald 
Lebovits 
 
Robinson v. Bayerque, 5 Cal. 460, 
1855 WL 814 (Cal.) (Justice 
Heydenfeldt) 
“a California 
classic”47 
Zero 
N/A (Judge 
Lebovits derides) 
Denny v. Radar Industries, 28 
Mich.App. 294 (1970) (Judge 
Gillis) 
N/A. “But brevity is 
vice if it leads to 
inadequate 
explanation.”48 
One 
 
 
 
 
  43.  Major Emily C. Schiffer, Book Review, 187 MIL. L. REV. 174, 179-80 (2006) (citing 
Transcript of the Justice Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project: Interviews with Justice Blackmun, 
Conducted by Professor Harold Hongju Koh, YALE LAW SCHOOL at 18 (July 6, 1994-Dec. 13, 1995). 
  44.  Taylor, supra note 37, at B8. 
  45.  Id. 
  46.  Robert Klonoff, Memories of a Law Clerk, 47 HOUSTON L. REV. 573, 576-77 (2010). 
  47.  Gerald Lebovits, Short Judicial Opinions: The Weight of Authority (continued), 76-SEP 
N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 60 (2004). 
  48.  Id. 
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III. DISTINGUISHING AUTHORITY 
The third and fourth sorts of favorites are most provocative and inform 
the theorizing in this Article. These are respectively non-authoritative 
opinions (alternative concurrences and dissents) and majority opinions that 
don’t cite to authority. I first bring some clarity to this notion of authority 
in legal argumentation. A common pedagogical move is to distinguish the 
“binding” case as authoritative from the merely “persuasive” case or 
academic article etc., which we cite to because of its quality of thought 
and relevance in content. What makes a case binding is its vertical 
hierarchy within our own jurisdiction or, in certain contexts, the horizontal 
force of the same court of appeal within that same jurisdiction (what we 
refer to as stare decicis).49 If a legal text is authoritative, we are bound by 
it for content-independent reasons.50 These include institutional values of 
predictability and consistency, Burkean prudence, and even ancestral ideas 
of respect for the past associated with Anthony Kronman.51 We don’t care 
if the prior case law is normatively good or bad, well-reasoned or 
sophistic, efficient or archaic, etc. We are indifferent to the substance of 
the opinion; we cite it because we feel obliged.52 
If this is what defines authoritativeness, then our separate universe of 
persuasive materials must instead be cited only for its quality of thought. 
Those materials are instructive for the court because they contain good 
ideas and are apposite to the present case. This ever-expanding universe of 
non-authoritative materials includes things like case law from outside our 
home jurisdiction, foreign case law from another national court,53 legal 
scholarship, your dictionary,54 social science,55 and other “modern 
authority” such as the famous Dr. Kenneth and Mamie Clark doll 
 
 
  49.  E.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2010). 
See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 259 (2010) (“Repeatedly, 
Hand regretted the injustice of certain laws even while he felt bound to apply them.”). 
  50.  Professor Merryman cataloged many of these reasons – including ancestor worship – with 
notable pith in John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court 
Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 621-626 (1954) [hereinafter Authority of Authority].. 
  51.  E.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE. L.J. 1029 (1990). 
  52.  Cf. Heirs of Ludlow v. Johnston, 3 Ohio 553, 567 (1828); Milor v. Farrelly, 25 Ark. 353, 
363 (1869) (“[T]he meaning of words, sentences, and phrases must not be distorted in order to sustain 
a favorite opinion.”). See also McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa. 352, 361 (1870) (“[A] judge has no right to 
adhere to his own favorite opinions, after they have been reversed or overruled.”). 
  53.  See, e.g., Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 59 (2009). 
  54.  See, e.g., Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a 
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999). 
  55.  John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488-95 (1986). 
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experiment from Brown v. Board of Education,56 unpublished authority,57 
and, maybe most controversially, Wikipedia.58 Alternative concurrences 
and dissents that have not yet “ripened” into doctrine also fall in this 
universe. However useful this binary of binding/persuasiveness is as an 
introductory teaching lens for the young lawyer, Frederick Schauer has 
convincingly shown that it is conceptually flawed.59 In practice, this 
kaleidoscope60 of persuasive materials is not cited simply for the 
materials’ ideas but because these materials possess a weight attached to 
the credibility of the author. Lawyers and judges cite them not just because 
of what they say but because of who said it. These materials function as 
cognitive authority to the extent we trust the author as a valid source.61 
These mislabeled “persuasive” materials are thus cited to for content-
independent reasons as well and blur with our conventionally authoritative 
case law (on-point prior majority opinions from within our jurisdiction). 
Schauer instead uses the lexicon of “optional authority” to describe the 
elective use of academic commentary or case law from a neighboring 
jurisdiction.62 Amy Griffin uses this same prism in her contextual 
approach to teaching legal argument.63 Still, whatever we call it, there is an 
assumption here that legal writers need to cite some kind of authority to 
justify the main argumentative moves they make. Citing to optional 
authority like dissents might be a suboptimal choice for a judge, but 
refusing all authority is just puzzling. We might question if a judge is even 
intelligibly doing what we think of as “legal reasoning” when she avoids 
use of citation altogether – is there a source of law for a decision without 
citation? Even Justice Breyer writing at the U.S. Supreme Court, where 
indeterminacy claims of legal realism “are at their acme,”64 sensed an 
obligation to reach for optional foreign authority from Zimbabwe65 to 
 
 
  56.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
  57. Amy J. Griffin, Dethroning the Hierarchy of Authority, 97 OR. L. REV. 51, 78-79 (2018). 
  58.  Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 
36 (2009). See also Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 27, 48-53 (2010); Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and 
the Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 920 (2011). 
  59.  Schauer, Authority and Authorities, supra note 24, at 1941 (“For once we understand that 
genuine authority is content-independent, we are in a position to see that persuasion and acceptance 
(whether voluntary or not) of authority are fundamentally opposed notions.”). 
  60.  Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. 
1673, 1690 (2000) (referring to our new “kaleidoscope of sources”). 
  61.  Id. at 1676 (“By ‘cognitive authority’ I mean the act by which one confers trust upon a 
source.”). 
  62.  Schauer, Authority and Authorities, supra note 24, at 1952. 
  63.  Griffin, supra note 57. 
  64.  Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 646 (1995). 
  65.  Knight v. Florida, 120 S.Ct. 459, 463 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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justify his dissent from denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida: “I want to 
do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have to write 
something that–you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite 
something. . . . what am I going to use?”66 Is “nothing” a valid response to 
Justice Breyer? 
IV. CONTRARY AUTHORITY AND WHY WE LIKE IT 
I thus turn to my third category of favorite opinion: the concurring or 
dissenting opinion. I distinguish non-majority from majority opinions 
(including, of course, opinions for the court) in this Article given the 
different discourse contexts and generic expectations of each text. Jurists 
disproportionately select non-majority opinions as their favorites.67 At first 
blush, this is curious. In our colloquial sense of the word, it feels anti-
authority for an institutional actor like a judge to select these “subversive” 
opinions.68 We would expect judges and academics to select opinions that 
were consequential, and non-governing concurrences and dissents are by 
definition not, at least until they ripen as prior reasoning for a turn in the 
doctrine. But from a discursive perspective it’s not surprising that non-
majority opinions are favorited. They are written with a vital purpose and 
for a future audience.  
Concurrences and dissents are written to expand and critique and not 
necessarily to justify or explain. This structural posture allows the author 
to write by implicit reference, and to ignore points of argument that are 
rote (procedure, syllogistic reasoning) or to retreat from gaps or 
vulnerabilities in her own argument. The concurring or dissenting author 
can be selective in what she includes, and this allows for a level of 
improvisation or dialectic that would be problematic in the context of a 
majority opinion. The concurring or dissenting author can take a surgical 
approach to critiquing only those points where her argument is most 
compelling.69 This allows her to write with pith. Nor does she have to 
 
 
  66.  Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 
531 (2005). See also Emily Bazelon, What Would Zimbabwe Do?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/what-would-zimbabwe-do/304298/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZ3X-AX28].  
  67.  See infra SECTION V. DISSENTING FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES.  
  68.  Robert Bendiner, The Law and Potter Stewart: An Interview With Justice Potter Stewart, 
35 AM. HERITAGE (Dec. 1983), https://www.americanheritage.com/law-and-potter-stewart-interview-
justice-potter-stewart [https://perma.cc/CQ8Y-SX9T], (“[W]hen I went to law school we had a 
professor who said dissenting opinions are nothing but subversive literature.”). 
  69. Cf. Merryman, supra note 50, at 665 (“[A] dissent or concurring opinion is usually limited 
to discussion of only some of the points considered in the majority opinion.”). 
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provide a fully reasoned basis for her decision. She can avoid the 
expository style of a majority opinion, because she does not have the 
managerial burden of providing instructive guidance to lower court judges, 
or the bar, or other readers who might be basing their counsel or behavior 
on the contours of the majority holding. It is the personal appeal of the 
judge, in which she can communicate as an individual and not simply as 
an institutional voice. These elements would seem to make this genre of 
opinion much more likeable, but of course I suffer from selection bias. 
Richard Primus reminds us that “part of the reason why we think of 
dissents as being well written is that we only read the good ones.”70 We 
have little reason to remember a stale opinion. 
We can make a broad distinction between these institutional and 
personal voices in opinion writing. First, I remind the reader that the 
institutional voice is not all bad. Justice Scalia, himself a vivid dissenter, 
remarked that although writing the dissent might be more fun to author 
“because […] it’s yours,” he would much rather be part of the majority.71 
Of course, the majority author “wins,” for lack of a better verb. But she 
can also make use of writing strategies as majority author that empower 
her voice and provide it an institutional gravity that shapes reader 
perceptions of her judicial opinion – and our legal method – as neutral and 
objective. Robert Ferguson first outlined the generic (genre-based) 
requirements of the judicial opinion.72 Two genre elements of the majority 
opinion that are particularly useful to the majority author are what 
Ferguson described as the “monologic voice” and the “rhetoric of 
inevitability.”73 These pair to create an atmosphere in which the author’s 
reasoning is ineluctably sound and correct. The majority author can frame 
the legal question to suit her own analysis and construct an argument that 
anticipates counter-responses in a way that she can easily manage. The 
feint is that the counter is acknowledged, but it’s never damning. The 
majority author remains in control of the outcome. 
Catherine Langford extends this academic discussion of judicial genre 
to the context of dissents.74 In contrast to majority opinions, dissents 
possess an “individualistic tone” and use an “advocacy medium.”75 They 
 
 
  70.  Primus, supra note 34, at 267. 
  71.  Supreme Court Justice Scalia, C-SPAN (June 19, 2009) (at 26:30), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?286079-1/supreme-court-justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/4N2J-6GN7]. 
  72. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
(1990). 
  73.  Id. at 204. 
  74.  Catherine L. Langford, Toward a Genre of Judicial Dissent: Lochner and Casey as 
Exemplars, 9 COMM. L. REV. 2 (2009). 
  75.  Id. at 1 (2009). 
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are written not to explain or justify, but to persuade. To persuade the 
future. The unique audience of the dissent (and I argue concurring 
opinions can be included here as well) provides these opinions a 
transcendental context that encourages the author to tap into the first 
principles of our legal system. In this expanded horizon, the case law 
reference transforms from the authoritative text-in-itself to a data point 
reflection of more fundamental currents in the law. This echoes the 
historical citation to “custom” in our Anglo-American legal tradition.76 It 
suggests that the amorphous space where black-letter doctrine 
transmogrifies into general principle. 
For all of these reasons – its surgical approach to critique; lack of need 
for expository writing; transcendental context – the concurring or 
dissenting opinion often includes fewer citations to case law. It might be 
that our favorite jurists select these opinions for reasons that are separate 
from the discrete fact they lack citation. Our favorite jurists would not 
necessarily be validating this intuitive approach to legal argument. But it 
also seems true that they don’t mind their lack of citation either. Certainly, 
they have many great candidate opinions to choose from, and sparse 
citation is an easy way to ding one and facilitate the process of 
elimination. But low-citation opinions are favorited anyway, despite an 
intuitive approach to argument construction that could be derided as 
lacking rigor or respect for the integrity of our legal system and common 
law method.  
 
 
 
 
  76.  See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 119, 131-34 (1973). 
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TABLE 3: CONCURRENCE AND DISSENTS 
Favorite 
Jurist 
Favorite Opinion Superlative language Citations  
Justice 
Scalia 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944) (Justice Jackson; 
dissent) 
“favorite” (hearsay)77 One 
Justice 
Brennan 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) (Justice Harlan; dissent)78 
“masterful dissent” Several, but it’s a 
longer opinion 
Justice 
Kavanaugh; 
Sanford 
Levinson 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(Justice Jackson; concurrence) 
“one of the four 
greatest opinions” 
(Kavanaugh); 
“my favorite” 
(Levinson) 
Zero “above the 
line,” but many 
footnotes 
Judge Posner Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (Justice Holmes; dissent) 
“a rhetorical 
masterpiece” 
Several, and it's a 
short opinion 
Judge 
Lebovits 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919) (Justice Holmes; 
dissent) 
“his greatest dissent” Zero, but maybe 
four 
Judge Justice Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (Justice Goldberg; 
concurrence) 
“my favorite 
opinion”79 
Many, but still a 
novel meditation 
on the 9th 
Amendment 
N/A (still 
un-favorited) 
People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 
455, 218 P.2d 769 (1950); Weber 
v. Superior Ct., 35 Cal.2d 68, 216 
P.2d 871 (1950); Central Contra 
Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Superior 
Ct., 34 Cal.2d 845, 215 P.2d 462 
(1950) (all dissents authored by 
Justice Jesse W. Carter of the 
Supreme Court of California 
(1939-1950)) 
N/A. Professor 
Merryman is unsure 
how to interpret this 
lack of citation. He 
supposes Justice Carter 
agreed with the 
majority’s selection of 
cited authority, but not 
its application of cited 
authority to the facts in 
dispute.80 
Zero 
 
 
  77.  Bob Egelko, Scalia’s Favorite Opinion? You Might be Surprised, SFGATE (Oct. 30, 2015, 
9:00 A.M.), http://blog.sfgate.com/politics/2015/10/30/scalias-favorite-opinion-you-might-be-
surprised/ [https://perma.cc/B9QW-7B46]. But see Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation in Children’s 
Cases: The Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 393, 396 n.7 (2012) (citing to JEFFREY 
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 317 (2007) as evidence that 
Scalia has described Crawford v. Washington as his favorite opinion). 
  78.  But see Justice John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 275 
(2005) (Justice Stevens tells us: “Bill's contribution to the work of the Court is legendary. I think I 
remember him saying that Goldberg v. Kelly was his favorite opinion.”). I include this contrary point 
here for reference, but I note this is technically hearsay, even if coming from an icon like Justice 
Stevens. Justice Brennan preferred to be a bit opaque on the topic of his favorites. An 1987 ABA 
profile suggests he often deflected with a charming analogy: “He refuses to name the Court decision of 
which he is most proud, or his favorite opinion, using a standard line: ‘You might as well ask which of 
my children I prefer.’” David O. Stewart, Justice Brennan at 80, A.B.A. J. 61, 63 (1987). See also 
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 445 n.266 (2004). 
  79.  William Wayne Justice, Recognizing the Ninth Amendment’s Role in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1241 (1996). 
  80.  Merryman, supra note 50, at 665 (1954). 
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V. DISSENTING FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES 
I begin my discussion of favorite dissents with Justice Holmes’ iconic 
opinion in Abrams. The prolific Judge Gerald Lebovits of the Supreme 
Court of New York has taught legal writing courses at seemingly every 
New York-area law school and has authored literally hundreds of 
publications on legal writing. In footnote 24 of “Short Judicial Opinions: 
The Weight of Authority” he tells us:  
Justice Holmes once wrote an opinion that cited not a single case. 
See Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield, 257 U.S. 66 
(1921). In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919), his 
greatest dissent, he again cited no case.81 
Today we remember Abrams as the first articulation of a “marketplace of 
ideas” approach to freedom of expression. It is a brilliant metaphor that 
embeds fundamental truths about modern life (we’re all fallible, truth is 
relative, let’s listen to each other, etc.) into the text of the First 
Amendment.82 There is no prior case law for this position, but Holmes 
reassures us that the free trade of ideas “at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.”83 He does not need to justify his framing of the problem 
here in Abrams or detail reasons to explain why his theory is indeed the 
only valid theory of the Constitution on this point. Because of his 
reputation and his personal approach to writing, we trust him and don’t 
ask for additional justification to test the validity of his claims or the 
accuracy of his perspective. 
Holmes’ next argumentative move is equally brilliant, as he steps 
outside his role as judge and comments as a participant-observer on the 
special challenges of freedom of expression in the context of democratic 
self-government: 
[Our Constitution] is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. 
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon 
 
 
  81.  Lebovits, Short Judicial Opinions: The Weight of Authority, supra note 47, at 60 n.24 
(2004) (emphasis added). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. also shares the title of the Great Dissenter, and 
so there is an exponent of greatness here. E.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITTANICA (last visited June 22, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Oliver-Wendell-
Holmes-Jr [https://perma.cc/8KAF-GRP6] (“byname The Great Dissenter”). The first Harlan is the 
other titleholder. See Eric Schepard, The Great Dissenter's Greatest Dissents: The First Justice 
Harlan, the "Color-Blind" Constitution and the Meaning of His Dissents in the Insular Cases for the 
War on Terror, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (2006). 
  82.  See Andrew Cohen, The Most Powerful Dissent in American History, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 
10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-most-powerful-dissent-in-
american-history/278503/ [https://perma.cc/48FX-S7MV].  
  83.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that 
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally 
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death … 84 
Holmes nears the proverbial fourth wall as a writer and has his own 
“postrealist encounter” with the nature of legal argument (Levinson). He 
transcends his Olympian detachment,85 and he transcends the text of the 
First Amendment, to form a general theory of freedom of expression based 
in the very real truth that judges – like those they judge – have limited 
knowledge and are engaged in a social project86 (constitutional 
construction) that lacks a model or blueprint. This reader-aware, 
exploratory approach makes it a paradigm example of the “impure” style 
of opinion writing described by Judge Posner in “Judges’ Writing Styles 
(And Do They Matter?).” The impure style aims to be conversational, 
accessible, concise and – this is the hardest part – effortless.87 Importantly, 
the impure stylist considers the layperson.88 This consideration provides a 
conceptual link for us to connect the reasoning with the aesthetics of first 
principles opinion writing: the impure stylist must generalize core truths 
rather than obscure her reasoning with jargon or insider references such as 
case citations. Indeed, in a separate article, Judge Lebovits specifically 
warns the would-be impure stylist against under-citing her opinions: 
“[i]mpurists tend not to cite enough authority.”89 Though Holmes, of 
course, does not need to follow the prescriptions for a newbie judge (or 
clerk). And certainly not when writing in dissent. 
Another interesting choice from Judge Lebovits is to label this as a no-
citation opinion. Per my count, the Abrams dissent contains four case law 
references. However, these function as illustrative asides, as a sort of 
namedrop. For example, Holmes mentions in passing Swift & Co., in 
 
 
  84.   Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
  85.  E.g., GUNTHER, supra note 47, at 294 (“While Holmes read widely and engaged fully in the 
intellectual life of his times, his was an attitude of remote, Olympian detachment: he was rarely 
interested in contemporary political battles or concerned about their outcome.”). 
  86.  E.g., Larry Kramer, We the People, BOS. REV. (Feb./Mar. 2004) 
https://bostonreview.net/archives/BR29.1/kramer.html [https://perma.cc/TL4S-NFSW]; see also Paul 
W. Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 115 (2014). 
  87.  Posner, supra note 5, at 1430-31 (“Paradoxically, the impure judicial stylists generally take 
more pains over style than the pure stylists do. Unless one is a particularly gifted writer, it takes much 
effort to make an opinion seem effortless!”). 
  88.  Id. at 1431. 
  89.  Gerald Lebovits, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 284 
(2008). 
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which he previously articulated his theory of criminal intent.90 We can 
make the semantic distinction that here this cited “authority” does not 
exert content-independent force on his own thinking. It does not directly 
persuade or inform but is instead a mere illustration of a principle that 
stands apart from the cited case. The other three cited cases (Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs) were also authored by Holmes and suggest the 
impression of a string citation, or the shared assumption that this doctrinal 
point is settled law, and “not a big deal” worth fussing over with actual 
deliberation. The cited authority in Abrams does not frame or inspire 
Holmes’ own response to the presented legal conflict. These citations, 
however, still leave footprints so that readers can situate Holmes’ dissent 
within a broader network of case law. The prior cases help identify what 
sort of opinion this is, even if the identity of this opinion (as the theory of 
the marketplace of ideas) has little to do with the cited case law. 
 We see a similar use of authority in the favorite opinion of Justice 
Scalia. In his Korematsu dissent, the only case that Justice Jackson refers 
to is the Japanese-American curfew case, Hirabayashi, not as a model of 
reasoning but instead to cabin its relevance and suggest that the Supreme 
Court should not repeat its earlier mistake of affirming this targeted 
curfew.91 Jackson made a comparable move in his Youngstown Steel 
concurrence. His intentional choice to maroon all case law citations 
subjacent the actual text of the opinion to the footnotes suggests that while 
they illustrate his thinking, these cases should not be confused as the 
reasoned basis for his standalone concurrence. 
In Justice William Brennan’s In Defense of Dissents, Brennan spends 
most of his essay honoring one dissent in particular, “the first Justice 
Harlan’s remarkable dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson [which] is at once 
prophetic and expressive of the Justice’s constitutional vision, and, at the 
same time, a careful and methodical refutation on the majority’s legal 
analysis in that case.”92 For Brennan, this is a “masterful dissent,” but it is 
also a dissent that relies on sparse case law. Indeed, in the second section 
of the opinion on racial equality, Harlan includes only an efficient string 
citation to the line of jury cases after Strauder and a quotation to Gibson v. 
State of Mississippi for the broad principle of equality before the law.93 
 
 
  90.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (citing Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375 (1905)). 
  91.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
  92.  William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431 (1986). 
  93.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Gabriel 
Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996) (for an 
exploration of Harlan’s own prejudice to Chinese Americans as reflected in Plessy and United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark). 
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The only citation over the next seven pages is to an anti-canonic case to 
avoid comparison to: Dred Scott.94 According to Brennan: 
In his appeal to the future, Justice Harlan transcended, without 
slighting, mechanical legal analysis; he sought to announce 
fundamental constitutional truths as well. He spoke not only to his 
peers, but to his society, and, more important, across time to later 
generations. He was, in this sense, a secular prophet, and we 
continue, long after Plessy and long even after Brown v. Board of 
Education, to benefit from his wisdom and courage.95 
Justice Harlan writes from a transcendental purview for a future audience. 
In Brennan’s words, he is writing as a “secular prophet:”96 not from the 
contextualized perspective of a doctrinalist but with the core values and 
spirit of the Reconstruction Amendments, in particular, and the 
Constitution, more generally, in mind. It is written from first principles. 
VI. REASONS AND THEIR LIMITS 
 Despite our conditioning as common law lawyers, it is not surprising 
that these no-citation or low-citation opinions are our favorites. They 
simply write better – they are lighter, crisper, more vibrant, more natural. 
Footnoting is skullduggery,97 but in-text references can clutter. They 
complicate. They obscure the actual thinking of the writer by substituting 
a contextual event for a proposition it is supposed to reflect. They pull the 
author away from the opinion she would otherwise craft. Judges quip, “it 
won’t write,” to express frustration when their vision of an opinion does 
not have supportive case law.98 Precedent is an obstacle for the writer. 
Sure, it is an obstacle that judges are used to confronting. The wise and 
strategic use of case law can be its own kind of craft, as best seen in the 
elevated “pure” style of Cardozo. Nonetheless, in this Article, I am 
focused on the above-great tranche of opinion. I am chasing the perfect 
 
 
  94.  E.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
  95.  Brennan, supra note 92, at 432. 
  96. Id. at 432. 
  97.  Arthur Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 1009 
(1990). 
  98.  E.g., Schauer, Authority and Authorities, supra note 24, at 1951 (2008); Chad M. Oldfather, 
Writing, Cognition and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1284-85 (2008); 
Posner, supra note 5, at 1447. 
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opinion, which can’t be interrupted with a distracting reference or 
distorted to maintain doctrinal integrity.99 
At a more threshold level, we can ask when we should bother to write 
a judicial opinion at all, let alone cite something. Certain kinds of legal 
thinking evade articulation, and the quality of our judicial opinions might 
be lessened if judges are forced to wrestle with these tensions between 
human cognition and language. In Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of 
the Judicial Process, Chad Oldfather introduces the concept of verbal 
overshadowing, or our tendency to cite to articulable reasons to explain 
our decisions even when they are actually based on less effable 
reactions.100 We can posit that it’s sometimes worse to provide a false 
reason, or distort our thinking to contrive an articulable reason, than to 
simply avoid the bothersome problem of explaining these sorts of gestalt 
decisions at all; for example, the kind of complex, contextual decisions 
that typify factual determinations.101 Fortunately, our legal institutions 
comport fairly well with our needs for either written or unwritten decision-
making. Juries try facts, but they don’t narrate their reasoning. The bench 
decisions made by trial judges (regarding witness credibility, probitive 
value of potentially prejudicial evidence etc.) do not generally require a 
recorded opinion or even oral justification. But we can expand to question 
whether judges are being asked to construct doctrine around similar kinds 
of gestalt intuitions or are expected to rationalize framing decisions that 
rely on tacit knowledge.  
One doctrinal example of overshadowing might be our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence on search and seizure. In a candid C-SPAN 
interview, Justice Scalia poked fun at his earlier disagreements with 
Justice Rehnquist as to whether a constitutional search case was a “plum 
assignment” or instead a “dog.”102 Scalia argued that the typical Fourth 
Amendment case does not present a discrete legal question but is instead 
an iterative factual permutation (“variation three thousand five hundred 
 
 
  99.  Cf. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Process, supra note 98, at 
1331 (“We might be willing to tolerate suboptimal assessments of the appropriate content of doctrine 
in order to promote certainty and to facilitate a stable regime of precedent.”). 
  100.  Id. at 1310-11. 
  101.  Id. at 1286-87.  
Sometimes, in other words, requiring an opinion would lead to a worse decision. Primarily 
these will be decisions that turn largely on the assessment of complex, fact-intensive 
situations in which largely inarticulable, context-based judgments matter more than precision 
and technical analysis, the sorts of decisions, in other words, as to which judges often do not 
issue opinions. 
Id. 
  102.  Supreme Court Justice Scalia, supra note 71, at 23:30. 
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and forty-two” to quote Scalia103) best suited for a jury’s evaluation and 
disposition. Even if gifted judges like Scalia can articulate a reasoned 
justification to resolve such cases based on gestalt, the opinions are 
unlikely to be natural or effortless (i.e. perfect).  
In part, this is because of the tension between doing and explaining. 
As Michael Polanyi famously observed, “we can know more than we can 
tell.”104 Or, we have “tacit knowledge” that is difficult to precisely 
articulate. Polanyi used the example of bicycle riding to capture the truth 
that we have difficulty explaining many quotidian activities that we are 
seemingly very competent at.  
Our very best judges have this same tacit knowledge in regard to case 
framing. By framing, I mean the threshold determination of deciding what 
sort of case it is.105 This is sometimes referred to as issue diagnosis. Karl 
Llewellyn also referred to this as a kind of “situation sense” or “horse 
sense.”106 To continue our metaphor, Dan Kahan employed the remarkable 
example of the chick sexer to analogize the work of lawyers.107 Sadly, 
male chicks are not very useful to egg farmers, and it’s apparently 
economical for farmers to pay chick sexers a fairly handsome income to 
immediately identify and separate them. In their infancy, male chicks are 
effectively indistinguishable from female chicks, but the professional 
chick sexer develops techniques of pattern recognition so that she can 
efficiently identify the male chick even if she cannot readily explain what 
she is doing or how she does it. To abstract, she is distinguishing cases but 
is unable to explain the reasons that justify her choices. 
Fortunately for the chick sexer, she is not paid to provide reasons for 
why she identifies a chick’s sex. However, for lawyers and judges, 
explanation is a core part of their job descriptions.108 James Boyd White 
asked us to speculate on a world without judicial opinions and how it 
might resemble the direct democracy of Classical Athens, whose legal 
system was essentially the unexplained votes of its citizenry on sundry 
 
 
  103.  Supreme Court Justice Scalia, supra note 71, at 23:30. 
  104.  Adjudication in Aesthetic Sports, supra note 8, at 278. 
  105.  Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 53 (2010) (“The exercise of 
judgment pervades the creation and application of legal standards in a way that is not true of math. 
There are indisputably correct answers in math, but not (or at least not always) in law.”). 
  106. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960). 
  107.  Adjudication in Aesthetic Sports, supra note 8, at 292-93; see also Dan M. Kahan, Yale 
Law School Commencement Remarks, ADDRESS AT THE YALE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
COMMENCEMENT, https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsca/27 [https://perma.cc/M33T-4EHX] (last 
amended May 25, 2006). See also David Beckett, Learning to Be – At Work, in “BECOMING” A 
PROFESSIONAL: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONAL LEARNING 57, 63-64 (referring 
to literature on chick sexing, apprenticeship and tacit knowledge). 
  108.  E.g., Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32 
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 525, 527 (2009) (“Judges also generally explain their decisions…”). 
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matters.109 It would certainly be different from our own common law 
system, where the reasons in support of a holding have as much as 
precedential effect as the decision itself. Professor Schauer observed that 
the reasons judges provide to justify their decisions don’t necessarily have 
to be convincing or well formed, but they have to be there. There has to be 
something that would follow the word “because” in a sentence.110 There 
are many good reasons to require reasons. It is a check on judges to make 
sure they are rigorous and thorough in their resolution of a case.111 
Requiring reasons serves a public legitimacy function by providing some 
level of accountability to an otherwise undemocratic institution and 
ensures that the work of judges is done in good faith. As a more general 
legitimation move, reason-giving suggests to the world that law is an 
intelligible thing and that legal reasoning is different from the mere act of 
calling heads or tails, red or black, win or lose. Legal reasoning can’t be 
conclusory. 
The tension here is that the reasons judges give to explain or justify 
their holdings might often differ from the actual reasons that motivated 
their decisions (now a realist platitude). The quip of a judge’s breakfast 
being the etiological cause of her decision could very well be true in the 
rare case, but no judge has yet been so candid about this.112 Even our most 
culinary-inclined judges might not realize that an insipid omelet is what 
triggered their response to a case. This is all to say that a judge might not 
know precisely what informed her decision, or she might know that it’s 
based in part on reasons that are not considered sufficiently legal and thus 
cite to other reasons that are acceptable in our legal culture. In most all 
cases, this is fine. What we generally care about is that the judge can 
justify her decision with an accepted reason and that lawyers or judges can 
then cite these same reasons to in resolving future similar cases. The actual 
etiology of decision-making might not matter if the judge can harness 
good “legal” reasons (i.e. based in legal precedent or employing other 
 
 
  109.  James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion for?, 62 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1995). See 
also Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial Dispute 
Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 150 (asking us to “imagine a system without stare 
decisis or precedent.”) (citing DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: 
THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 10 (2d ed. 2009)).  
  110.  Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 64, at 636. 
  111.  E.g., Lebovits, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, supra note 89. 
  112.  Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 410 (1985) 
In its more extreme versions, Realism would maintain that sufficient precedents, some conflicting and 
many intersecting at various angles, exist so that an appellate judge can rationalize from precedent or 
written law a result conceived prior to consultation of that precedent or law. Under this view, a judge's 
own moral, political, psychological, Oedipal, or intestinal predilections determine the result. 
Id.  
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accepted modalities of legal thinking) that maintain the perceived integrity 
of our legal system and common law method.113 
I don’t deride reason giving, but I do remind the reader that we are 
hunting for perfection. We can posit that because some causal reasons 
remain unknown to the judge-author or are otherwise un-articulable, 
forcing the judge to explain her decision lessens the cultivated zen that 
characterizes the effortless opinion. 
VII. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF EFFORTLESSNESS 
The threshold problem of situating an opinion that lacks any reference 
to prior case law is more challenging. This is the under-theorized problem 
of how to identify an unexplained opinion rather than Schauer’s concern 
about providing reasons that justify a decisional outcome. A distinguishing 
trait of the no-citation opinion is its effortless construction and its narrative 
approach to case framing. But the corollary epistemological problem is: 
how do we know what kind of case this is, and how can we test or validate 
its outcome if it lacks any citations to calibrate its reasoning? Judge Posner 
has commented on the modern difficulty of evaluating a case as “good” or 
“bad.”114 Professor Oldfather agrees that in our post-realist world, so long 
as a judge can justify her outcome by reference to legitimate forms of 
judicial reasoning (e.g., case law support), it is difficult to deride the 
outcome as “wrong.”115 The opinion that cites to case law has the 
arithmetic responsiveness we see in a math problem. We can check it 
against itself. The question presented in a judicial opinion justifies its own 
existence. 
Although the no-citation opinion can potentially meet our perfection 
litmus of containing effortless writing and unstrained thinking, it is subject 
to the corollary problem of confirming how we can really know if its 
reasoning is sound or even relevant. I mentioned earlier the footprints in 
the Abrams dissent where Holmes refers to a network of case law that 
functions to contextualize and frame Abrams as a political speech First 
Amendment case, even if the prior case law is not directly relied on. A 
threshold explanatory move made by a judge is to reduce the case to a 
precise legal question so as to frame it for her analysis. This 
characterization situates the “monologic voice” (Ferguson) that the author 
 
 
  113.  Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 64, at 652-53 (1995); Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, 
and the Nature of the Judicial Process, supra note 98, at 1299-1300 (citing Martin P. Golding, A Note 
on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law, in JUSTIFICATION 124, 128 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John H. Chapman eds., 1986). 
  114.  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 3 (2008). 
  115.  Oldfather, Error Correction, supra note 105, at 50-51. 
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can then utilize to abstract and decontextualize the textured facts of the 
case into a pure question of law. It is a contrivance to distance the judge as 
objective arbiter and create the ineluctable sense of there being only one 
possible answer. 
This initial framing move doesn’t read as a justification because it is a 
convention of opinion writing, but it is still a strategic move on the part of 
the author to situate the case and frame her responsive analysis.116 This 
echoes discussion about the common metaphor of judges as umpires and 
debates as to whether they are simply “calling balls and strikes,” or 
constructing the strike zone, or doing something altogether different (like 
serving as a commissioner117 or being an aesthetic judge118 as in figure 
skating, diving, etc.). But the realist perspective has a threshold critique: 
there are no balls or strikes until the umpire calls them. They are judicial 
constructions. The question I am curious about is not how a judge discerns 
a ball from a strike, or constructs the strike zone, but the conditional 
question of how a no-citation or exploratory opinion can adequately 
explain to us what game we should even be playing – what sort of opinion 
is this, and what is its goal? 
 Sometimes we celebrate the inventive framing of a case. No judge can 
control the facts of the particular case they receive, and most judges have 
little control over their personal docket (as cases are commonly assigned 
by a chief judge or distributed by an impersonal bureaucratic formula). 
This is what makes the Cardozo oeuvre so compelling. We lionize him for 
his ability to transform Scalia’s “dog” into a “plum,” as in his famous 
Palsgraf decision.119 This judicial alchemy makes Cardozo an icon but 
also subject to critique from those like Judge Noonan, who argued that 
Cardozo lacked empathy and prioritized his own reputation as a judge over 
the parties to his cases.120 That he chose doctrinal evolution over factual 
integrity. 
In any event, we come across a core contradiction in this survey: what 
we do if the aspirational conventions of the perfect opinion and the merely 
 
 
  116.  Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Process, supra note 98, at 
1315 (discussing psychology of how initial framing or presentation of information informs audience 
reception).  
  117.  Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire, 119 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 113 (2009). 
  118.  See generally Adjudication in Aesthetic Sports, supra note 8. 
  119.  See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, 
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 23 (1976) (“Judges like Holmes and Cardozo 
remain hidden as they transmute the tawdry materials of life into aesthetic masterpieces.”). Judge 
Noonan later refers to Palsgraf as “the most famous tort case of modern times.” But, importantly, it’s 
not his favorite. Id. at 111. 
  120.  See generally id. at 111-51. 
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great opinion are diametric. This is not a question of scale or emphasis but 
of polarity. The great opinion includes careful citation and shepherds the 
reader through the opinion by including a contextual fact and procedure 
section that prompts a discernable legal question and cites to articulable 
reasons to justify its outcome. The perfect opinion is instead a first descent 
into the first principles of our law, an adventure for reader and writer 
without the map of prior case law. What if the judge-author fails in this 
attempt for perfection? A future contribution to this literature on judicial 
perfection might be to chart the remote corners of Westlaw for the 
ambitious judge who simply failed in this mission for perfection. What do 
these opinions look like? Where do they go? Do these judges, or the law, 
suffer? We can fairly ask who should aim for perfection and consider the 
cultural question of what informs judicial reputation. How does the 
individual credibility of a judge frame our expectations of what sorts of 
legal (or non-legal) arguments she is allowed to make? How can we 
identify the judges who Posner suggests may go “beyond the conventional 
categories of legal thinking [and employ] a style equal to the range of 
considerations that they consider relevant”?121  
We can assume that Posner includes himself in this category of the 
“beyond” judge. Indeed, Judge Wilkinson suggested that Posner’s style of 
judging works very well for him but that the majority of judges lack the 
intellect and panache to effectively pull off his pragmatic approach to 
dispute resolution.122 Posner, of course, does not need my advice on 
writing. We can certainly learn from him and his own choice of favorites. 
As mentioned, one of them is Justice Holmes’ canonic dissent from 
Lochner v. New York.123  
Holmes dives into the opinion. He doesn’t reframe it with a question 
prompt or write from authorial distance. Rather, he comments directly on 
the ulterior intellectual approach of the majority and considers a study plan 
for how he might form his own opinion on economic theory. He then 
reminds us this doesn’t really matter. It is a window into his interior 
monologue. It is unconscious thought.124 This begins his masterstroke: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of 
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed 
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before 
 
 
  121.  Posner, supra note 5, at 1449. 
  122.  J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 80-103 (2012). 
  123.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
  124.  Indeed, there is some evidence for Unconscious Thought Theory, or the claim that 
unmediated, spontaneous writing can represent our best thinking. See, e.g., Oldfather, Writing, 
Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Process, supra note 98, at 1326 (2008). 
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making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, 
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has 
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions 
in law.125 
It is so natural as to feel like we’ve come across a diary entry or his 
personal correspondence. The references are so fresh that they are almost 
startling. No one will ever forget Herbert Spencer and his Social Statics 
after reading Holmes’ dissent, even if Holmes never tells us what 
Spencer’s book is about. We know that it’s an ideology of one sort or 
another, and that ideologies are orthogonal to the concrete practice or 
interpreting a constitution. His points about police power, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and judicial process each resonate even if he doesn’t 
explicitly frame his analysis with a question presented or move 
deductively through his opinion. His dissent is cultivated spontaneity. It’s 
thought in action. It’s effortless – it’s zen.  
However, it is also a dissenting opinion. Although it meets many of 
our tests for the perfect opinion (written from first principles; effortless 
style; a zen sense of framing in which the author does not distort his actual 
thinking by explaining his instinctive sense of narrative argument to his 
audience), it also relies on implied reference to the facts and reasoning in 
the majority opinion. The more concerning problem is that Holmes “lost” 
this case. I am unsure if we can have a theory of law (here: that a perfect 
opinion exists, that at least some judges should aim for it, and that all of 
this is very good) that celebrates a non-majority opinion. A threshold test 
for any model of jurisprudence would seem to be if it creates law. This is 
basic quality control for a theorist. And Holmes’ dissent, at least not until 
its constructive overrule in 1938, was not “good law.” It wasn’t mandatory 
authority anywhere, for anything. 
I include one final qualification of the perfect opinion: It must be 
herculean. Ronald Dworkin famously created an ideal judge, Hercules, as 
a means to suggest the implicit normativity of our legal method.126 In 
 
 
  125.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
  126. One of Ronald Dworkin’s favorite examples of a “hard case” is of course Riggs v. Palmer, 
115 N.Y. 506 (1889). Cf. Understanding the Model of Rules: Toward a Reconciliation of Dworkin and 
Positivism, 81 YALE L.J. 912, 919 n.12 (1972). 
To leave the analysis at this may seem to elide almost all of the important questions about 
judicial decisionmaking [sic] those involving the institutional responsibilities of judges which 
are implicated in all decisions regarding the applicability and use of rules, and others 
concerning the appropriate ranking of values for various cases. But there is no answering 
these questions here; complex cases are the favorites of legal scholars, who will devote an 
entire essay to the dissection of just one. 
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Dworkin’s words, “I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of 
superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen.”127 It makes perfect 
sense to measure our potentially perfect opinions against Dworkin’s vision 
because his theory is, after all, one of perfection.128 Hercules is able to 
survey our expanse of available legal materials to channel the very best of 
the most relevant principles underlying our prior case law to form a 
majority opinion that is consistent with the integrity of the common law 
system.129 Importantly, identifying these synthetic principles does not 
require precise citation to the cases they are manifested in. Rather, 
Dworkin articulated a “concept of principles that ‘underlie’ or are 
‘embedded in’ the positive rules of law.”130 If our own human judge “is 
lucky, he may find, when he digs beneath the verbal surface of legal 
doctrine, the deep springs of the law.”131 Has one of our own ever enjoyed 
this apotheosis into Hercules? 
 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Per my count Riggs cited four cases – a modest number, but more than zero. In 
Riggs – and his other favorite hard case Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358 (1960) – 
“Dworkin sees courts interpreting the law in light of background principles as well as black-letter 
rules.” David O. Brink, The Forum of Principle, 15 APA NEWSLETTER ON PHIL. & L. 1, 2 (2015). 
Each judicial opinion has been previously analyzed for its use of principled argument, and I have little 
more to add here at the moment. More importantly, they each rely on case law. And so perhaps 
surprisingly, these Hercules-inspiring judicial opinions are themselves not perfect given my 
inductively-arrived criteria. They are not truly Herculean. 
  127.  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1975). 
  128.  E.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 283-85 
(2004) (describing Dworkin’s “aspirations of perfection”). 
  129.  E.g., Dworkin, supra note 127, at 1082-83. 
  130.  Id. at 1082-83. 
  131.  Posner, supra note 5, at 1447. 
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VIII. HERCULEAN OPINIONS 
“Grant for the sake of argument that what Hercules does is perfect.”132 
TABLE 3: HERCULEAN OPINIONS 
Favorite Jurist Favorite Opinion Superlative language Citations 
Bryan Garner; 
and 
Charles Fried 
West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943) (Justice Jackson) 
“a thing of beauty”133 
(Garner) 
a favorite, or at least his 
favorite Jackson opinion 
(who he thinks is one of 
the three best writers on 
the SCOTUS)134 (Fried) 
Two, but 
maybe three 
Judge Selya 
(self-citation) 
Levesque v. Anchor Motor 
Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 
(1987) (Judge Selya) 
“my favorite”135 Zero 
N/A (still un-
favorited) 
Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
City of Springfield, 257 U.S. 66 
(1921) (Justice Holmes) 
N/A Zero 
 
 We have two herculean candidates. West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette is a favorite first principles majority opinion 
authored by Justice Jackson; the overlooked Levesque v. Anchor Motor 
Freight, Inc. is from Judge Bruce Selya of the First Circuit. Judge 
Lebovits noted Holmes’ own no-citation majority opinion in Springfield 
Gas, but unfortunately it has not (yet) been favorited, and so it can’t be a 
perfect opinion (at least presently). 
Justice Jackson is an icon and has a deserved reputation as being a 
wonderful writer. Indeed, Jackson is cited by a majority of the current U.S. 
Supreme Court justices to be “their favorite writer ever to serve on the 
 
 
  132.  Don Herzog, Cute Prickly Critter with Presbyopia, 110 MICH. L. REV. 953, 962 n.18 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
  133.  Bryan A. Garner, Celebrating the powerful eloquence of Justice Robert Jackson, ABA 
JOURNAL (Oct. 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/powerful_eloquence_justice_robert_jackson 
[https://perma.cc/WX5J-YZZG].  
  134.  Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 647 (2011) (“Justice Jackson made 
some of the best and boldest decisions in the whole of our constitutional jurisprudence--my particular 
favorite is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette…”). 
  135.  Bruce M. Selya, In Search of Less, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1996). 
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court.”136 In his 2017 contribution to the Stanford Law Review, former 
Solicitor General Gregory G. Garre observed that “some of [Jackson’s] 
opinions are regarded as among the finest writings of the Supreme 
Court.”137 For Garre, “much of the force of his opinions comes from his 
focus on first principles and aversion to ‘legalese.’”138 Posner agrees that 
Jackson “cultivated a plain style with great success.”139 We should 
understand “plain” in the distinct sense of effortless and candid. Jackson 
was an aesthete in the total sense, and “surely the only Justice to be named 
best dressed man in America by the Custom Tailors Guild.”140 
Solicitor Garre’s reference to first principles echoes my theorizing in 
this Article, but I want to unpack a connection between writing theory and 
psychology that might explain this core trait of Jackson’s writing. 
Unconscious Thought Theory suggests that in certain contexts, 
unmediated, spontaneous thinking might be our best thinking and that 
deliberation can obscure or wooden the zen vitality of our original idea. 
We probably all share experiences where our “first take” was our best, but, 
as academics, we are aware of the Robert Graves aphorism, “there is no 
good writing, only good rewriting.” However, there is evidence that in 
certain limited contexts, our zen thoughts are our best thoughts: “the 
Unconscious Thought Theory literature suggests that the benefits of 
unconscious thought are achieved after the information necessary to a 
decision is carefully absorbed.”141 For our purposes, this theory suggests 
that the judge with accreted wisdom that comes from years of work in the 
law (tacit knowledge) might craft the effortless masterstroke from first 
principles, whereas the judicial novice lacks this same cultivated instinct 
and must labor from conventional sources of law.  
Justice Jackson’s varied experience (including as solicitor general, 
attorney general, chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials) provides an 
especially robust base of tacit knowledge from which to operate. This 
“situation sense” (à la Llewellyn) manifests in his ability to re-
contextualize the Korean War steel seizure facts into a first principles 
meditation on the fluid nature of comparing presidential v. congressional 
powers in the special terrain of national security law. In West Virginia 
 
 
  136.  Garner, supra note 133 (“Doubtless because Jackson was so unusually eloquent, a majority 
of the current justices name him as their favorite writer ever to serve on the court.”). 
  137.  Gregory G. Garre, Lessons from “America’s Advocate,” 69 STAN. L. REV. 1795, 1807 
(2017). 
  138.  Id. 
  139.  A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 7, at 140. 
  140.  Fried, supra note 134, at 649. 
  141.  Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Process, supra note 98, at 
1326. 
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State Board of Education v. Barnette, Jackson masterly connects the 
precise factual prompt of whether public school students can be required 
to salute the American flag to a synthetic look at the nature of symbols and 
their function in society: 
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag 
salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective 
way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to 
symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short 
cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges 
and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings 
to a flag or banner, a color or design.142 
 He discerns the core connection between communication and speech 
that explains the relevance of symbols to First Amendment doctrine. 
Justice Jackson then reflects on how the social value of symbolic 
communication can compete with the individual’s freedom to determine 
her own thoughts and beliefs. This is first principles theorizing on the 
nature of personality and the reserved right of the individual to construct 
her own identity. This does not require citation, and perhaps does not even 
have discrete case law to cite to. This is embedded in our Constitution’s 
design as a document that preserves individual autonomy separate from 
the reach of the state and perhaps manifests in the penumbras of the First 
Amendment, notions of substantive due process and the overlooked text of 
the Ninth Amendment.143 Jackson writes: 
It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge 
requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind … To 
sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill 
of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, 
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in 
his mind.144 
Of course, we cannot let public officials dictate the contents of our minds. 
This is itself a very important thought, and thus must be made in the best 
judicial prose. As confirmed by premier stylist Bryan Garner, Barnette is a 
“a thing of beauty.”145 Garner also notes that for an “eight-page opinion, 
 
 
  142.  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
  143.  See Justice, supra note 79, at 1241 (discussing his favorite opinion, Justice Goldberg’s 
concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, because “of its frank discussion of the role of the Ninth 
Amendment in constitutional interpretation”). Id. at 1241. 
  144.  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633-34. 
  145.  Garner, supra note 130. 
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Jackson quotes very little and cites only two cases.”146 I count three cases, 
but either way, Jackson is concerned with general principles more than 
data points and writes with a purview that transcends the immediate details 
of the case. It is an incomparable majority opinion, and it might be perfect. 
However, I do point out Garner’s own reservation! Jackson uses the 
clunky word choice of “therein” three times in Barnette.147 “No one is 
perfect,”148 even if our rare opinion might be. 
 I quickly remark on how Justice Jackson’s favorited opinions seem to 
synthesize his thinking on constitutional design with embedded principles 
of American democracy. Holmes’ reference to our “experiment” with self-
government in Abrams is a similar argumentative move. This citation to 
our identity as a democracy and our vision of a free people can be 
interpreted as a form of ethical argument put forward by Philip Bobbitt. In 
Constitutional Fate, Professor Bobbitt outlines his typology of 
constitutional reasoning in the U.S. Supreme Court.149 Of particular note 
for this Article is the Bobbitt modality of “ethical reasoning,” in which the 
Court reasons from our American ethos of national identity. Examples of 
ethical reasoning potentially include the description of Manifest Destiny in 
McCulloch v. Maryland150 or the reference to the Dr. Kenneth and Mamie 
Clark’s “doll experiment” in Brown v. Board of Education, including its 
implied sense that we—as a nation—cannot tolerate a segregated existence 
that fosters a sense of inferiority among black schoolchildren.151 
Neither the concept of Manifest Destiny nor social psychology are 
conventional forms of legal authority. However, the doll experiment’s 
implied value as a barometer of the Fourteenth Amendment and our 
constitutional core principle of equality before the law give it a legal 
valence that is not true of Manifest Destiny, or the purely instrumental 
argument based in economic thinking.152 I make this clarification to 
provide some content to our definition of what sorts of legal materials the 
herculean judge may fairly refer to when discerning the general principles 
 
 
  146.  Id. 
  147.  Id. 
  148.  Garre, supra note 137, at 1807 n.76 (2017) (“No one is perfect—Jackson ‘liked the word 
therein.’”) (quoting Garner, supra note 133).  
  149.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1982). 
  150.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). 
  151.  Philip Bobbitt, Methods of Constitutional Argument, 23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 449, 454-
55 (1989). 
  152.  But see Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between the Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 48 n.40 (1992) (“Another former law clerk mused: ‘Law & 
economics is to some degree helpful in practice, especially if you're arguing in the 7th Circuit. 
Otherwise I don't see much direct benefit to practice.’”). 
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in our law; to distinguish the principles integral to our positive law from 
other values or forms of reasoning which are separate. 
IX. REVISIONING LEVESQUE 
Judge Bruce Selya’s majority opinion in Levesque v. Anchor Motor 
Freight, Inc.,153 blurs the “fun” with the “herculean” opinion. It transcends 
itself by seeming to poke fun at the genre of the judicial opinion and its 
usual conventions. I am unsure if it’s great, yet it might indeed be perfect.  
For those unfamiliar with this lexophile senior judge from the First 
Circuit, I introduce him by his most identifiable gift – his incredible 
vocabulary. Here is a 1992 New York Times write-up:  
In Judge Selya's linguistic armamentarium, various entities may be 
described as exiguous (meager), struthious (ostrich-like), neoteric 
(modern, recent) or inconcinnate (unsuitable, awkward). His world 
is populated with people who are forever repastinating (digging 
again), resupinating (turning upside down), prescinding 
(withdrawing attention from), perfricating (rubbing thoroughly) or 
vaticinating (prophesizing).154 
Judge Selya is idiosyncratic, but is he an icon? It appears that other federal 
judges think he might be. According to one empirical study from 
Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, Selya was the fourth most-cited 
federal appellate judge outside her home circuit from 1998-2000 (behind 
only Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook and Sandra Lynch).155 Selya 
would not be surprised by his inclusion in this rarefied list. He is his own 
favorite judge. 
In a 1996 Texas Law Review symposium issue on favorite judicial 
opinions,156 the Honorable Bruce Selya selected his own opinion for the 
court in Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.157 Most judges at least 
feign humility. It is rare for a judge to indulge in this personal sort of 
hagiography in the pages of a law review. Given my own theory of 
perfection, I can’t disagree with the reason for his self-citation: 
 
 
  153.  Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 (1987). 
  154.  David Margolick, At the Bar; Sustained by Dictionaries, a Judge Rules That No Word, or 
Word Play, is Inadmissible., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1992, at B16, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/27/news/bar-sustained-dictionaries-judge-rules-that-no-word-word-
play-inadmissible.html [https://perma.cc/KW8R-3NM8].  
  155.  Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU 
ANN. SURVEY OF AM. L. 19, 28 (2005) (more precisely, the fourth most-cited federal appellate judge 
by other federal judges from outside the judge’s home circuit from 1998-2000). 
  156.  Selya, In Search of Less, supra note 135, at 1277. 
  157.  Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 (1987). 
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There is one thing--and one thing only--that redeems Levesque and 
distinguishes it from the mine-run of opinions which crowd the 
pages of the Federal Reports: it is the only full-dress, published 
appellate opinion of which I am aware that contains no citations. . . 
not a case, not a treatise, not a statute, not a law review article.158 
There is a reflexive move in Selya citing his own no-citation opinion as a 
favorite. The first principles judge signals to the legal reader that she 
possesses the transcendent sense of the inner workings of the common 
law.159 At the same time, the legal reader trusts that if a judge writes with 
this sort of effortless confidence, then she must necessarily be a gifted 
judge. The first principles judge does not write from anxiety but from the 
wisdom of tacit knowledge.160 
Judge Selya begins his own masterstroke: 
In this personal injury suit, David A. Levesque, plaintiff-appellant, 
sought to recover damages from Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 
(Anchor) and Joseph Tobin, defendants-appellees. The controversy 
arose in consequence of an accident which took place on March 14, 
1984. Briefly stated, on that day Tobin (an employee of Anchor) 
drove a multi-level car carrier, fully loaded, to a dealership in 
Cranston, Rhode Island. After parking in the dealership's lot, he 
began unloading the nine spanking new chariots which comprised 
this shipment.161 
There are two notable takeaways from this excerpted section. First, this is 
a run-of-the-mill negligence case. It does not involve existential threat, 
moral conflict or the “hard case” of conflicting authority in equipoise. 
Selya still aims to reason from first principles embedded in negligence 
doctrine. Torts professors now have evidence for their Constitutional Law 
colleagues that their subject area transcends itself. 
 
 
  158.  Selya, In Search of Less, supra note 135, at 1278 (though of course he misses Springfield 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield as a second no-citation majority opinion). 
  159.  Cf. Primus, supra note 34, at 258-59.  
The great Justice hypothesis has initial plausibility. Harlan, Holmes, and Brandeis were great 
Justices, and, in their opinions, authorship often seems to become authority. A question 
immediately arises, however, as to why those Justices are considered great in the first place. 
Is it not at least partly because they wrote great opinions, including, and perhaps especially, 
great dissents? If that is so, as it surely is, then the great Justice theory risks circularity. 
Id. 
  160.  See Shane Tintle, Citing the Elite: The Burden of Authorial Anxiety, 57 DUKE L.J. 487, 
500-01 (2007) (describing citation as reflective of a semiotics of anxiety, and the need to compensate 
for lack of confidence). 
  161.  Levesque, 832 F.2d at 702-03. 
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The other takeaway is that Selya is having some fun with this opinion, 
as reflected in the hyperbole of “nine spanking new chariots.”162 This 
language is not an outlier. Rather, Selya writes that plaintiff sued to 
“assuage his hurts”163, writes that defendant’s testimony was “less than 
exquisitely revelatory”164, and sprinkles his opinion with platitudes like 
“but life is not so simple”165 and repartees such as “it beggars credulity.”166 
This language is consciously baroque and didactic and would probably be 
perceived by most readers (especially parties to a case) as condescending. 
But perhaps Judge Selya is empathic to these parties and is instead 
reflecting on the nature of his occupation. He also inserts turgid language 
and jargon that could be read as commentary on the usual affectations of 
lawyerly writing; for example, his use of “ergo,”167 “nisi prius roll,”168 “no 
rational venireman,”169 “ideocratic,”170 or “the jury verdict should [not] be 
jettisoned.”171 This opinion is a sort of post-modern critique on 
bureaucracy and court process. It is sphinxlike. 
Other times Judge Selya seems to write with elegance on deep 
questions of epistemology in fact determination, the exact same sort of 
problem we struggled with earlier when thinking about cognition and 
reason-giving. Selya reminds us of the basic inscrutability of life and the 
limits of technology: 
There is no computer printout which can tell us the precise number 
of seconds that one must look before he leaps. Jurors, using 
common sense and collective experience assess credibility and 
probability, and proceed to make evaluative judgments, case by 
case: challenged behavior is or is not negligent. Indeed, this is the 
quintessential stuff of which jury questions are fashioned.172 
Is this how Judge Selya portrays modesty? He again argues for judicial 
restraint: “the ‘perhapses’ which dot this cryptic record are for factfinders 
to resolve—not for judges imperiously to dictate.”173 Just as we think we 
might be able to discern an identity for this curious opinion, to distinguish 
 
 
  162.  Levesque, 832 F.2d at 703. 
  163.  Id. 
  164.  Id.  at 703. 
  165.  Id. at 704. 
  166.  Id. 
  167.  Levesque, 832 F.2d at 703. 
  168.  Id. at 703. 
  169.  Id. at 704. 
  170. Id. 
  171. Id. 
  172.  Levesque, 832 F.2d. 
  173.  Levesque, 832 F.2d at 704. 
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it as either self-indulgent or instead a first principles meditation on the 
nature of judging, it ends (but with poetic use of space): 
We need go no further. The district court properly submitted the 
negligence issue for jury consideration and acted within its 
discretion in denying plaintiff's posttrial motion to upset the verdict. 
The judgment below must be 
 
Affirmed.174 
 Selya concludes his opinion in the elliptic manner that he must. This is 
not the only time Judge Selya has observed the bureaucratization of 
judicial work. In Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals 
Judge in the Information Age, Selya wrote persuasively on how increased 
workload has transformed judges “from thinkers to managers.”175 In short, 
that the ideal of the sage-judge is being corroded by the busywork of 
writing facile opinions like Levesque. The many “easy cases” that 
Frederick Schauer reminded us of (e.g., no thirty-four-year-old will ever 
be inaugurated as president)176 are meant to be disposed of before they 
enter the courtroom. They are not meant to be written about on appeal.  
In some ways Levesque reads as an inside joke Selya wrote only for 
himself (though it has been cited at least eleven times by later courts,177 
even if several of these are self-citations).178 It also could be read as 
dismissive of the work of prior judges who thought hard about these same 
questions of law and fact, and whose work should be cited as a courtesy. 
Judges are socialized to the norm of stare decisis,179 and the habit of 
citation becomes hard-wired into their thinking.180 When a judge ignores 
prior case law, we can read this as an intentional choice. The judge is not 
 
 
  174.  Id. at 705. 
  175.  Selya, Publish and Perish, supra note 8, at 406-07. 
  176.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 420 (1985). 
  177. Other judges have cited Levesque in: MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 
131 (1989); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 558 (1989); Bezanson v. Fleet Bank of 
New Hampshire, 45 F.3d 423, *423 (1995) (unpublished per curiam opinion); Smith & Nephew 
Dyonics v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, 62 F.3d 8, 14 (1995); Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden 
America, Inc. 591 F.3d 1, 13 (2009); Kenney v. Head, 670 F.3d 354, 360 (1st Cir. 2012); Guzman v. 
Boeing Company, 366 F.Supp.3d 219, 246-47 (2019). 
  178.  Judge Selya has cited Levesque in: Kassel v. Gannet Co. Inc., 875 F.2d 935, 943-44 (1989); 
La Amiga del Pueblo, Inc. v. Robles, 937 F.2d 689, 691 (1991); Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. 
Rivera-Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 619 n.3 (1994); Blinzler v. Marriott Intern., Inc. 81 F.3d 1148, 1153 
(1996). 
  179.  Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond 
Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 919, 954 (2008); Frank B. Cross, et al., Citations in 
the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 
497 (2010). 
  180.  Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground 
Shifts Under No Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 11 (2002). 
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making a mistake, but instead implies that what others conventionally 
do—citing to and reasoning from discernable authority—is somehow 
worthy of critique. The no-citation judge is bringing attention to herself, 
perhaps to suggest that citation is (at least sometimes) silly, pedantic, 
trivial or enervating. This does not mean it is necessarily “bad form”181 for 
Selya to avoid citation. Maybe this opinion itself is a play on the genre, 
and is meant to help his colleagues by reminding all of the legal 
community how bureaucratic pressures are competing with our envisioned 
role of judges as thinkers and writers.  
Selya knows he is doing something unconventional by avoiding all 
citation. Just in case his playful approach is not obvious to all readers, he 
includes a final clarifying footnote: 
It is no accident that this opinion is bereft of a single explicit 
citation to any statute, rule, or reported decision. The matter is a 
fact-intensive one. The only principles of law implicated in the case 
are so well settled as not to require citation of authority. Rather than 
exhibiting any lack of scholarship on our part, we view the pristine 
nature of these pages as a testament to our steadfast unwillingness 
to confer epicurean status on the bland and undistinguished fare 
which appellant has served up for our consideration.182 
Selya echoes the purist position on citation to case law and our earlier 
distinctions between citing authority as illustrative reference as opposed to 
reasoned basis. We should not cite to authority simply because it’s there 
and it’s relevant. Instead, we should only do so when that cited authority 
somehow informed our thinking – because it educated us or because the 
cited authority unexpectedly bound us. We should not cite to it simply as 
an ornament or an illustration of a mundane point of law. As someone 
writing on the value and use of citation, I find his thinking in this footnote 
provocative. As someone chasing the perfect opinion, I find this 
clarification to lack the intrepidness required of perfection. The perfect 
opinion justifies itself without explanation. It is beyond our epistemologies 
of self-validation, either that of citation or discursive footnote. It is an 
existential leap of faith.183 
 
 
  181.  Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e would consider it bad form 
to ignore contrary authority by failing even to acknowledge its existence…”). 
  182.  Levesque, 832 F.2d at 705, n.5. 
  183.  Holmes concludes his no-citation Springfiled Gas is relatively effortless, but still a bit self-
aware. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Springfield, 257 U.S. 66, 71 (1921) (“It is unnecessary 
to refer to the numerous cases upon classification by state laws in order to show that the distinction in 
question here is very far from being so arbitrary that we can pronounce it bad.”). 
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Selya addresses these epistemological concerns in his Texas Law 
Review symposium article by confirming that his reasoning in Levesque 
depended on “legal propositions [that are] … well-settled.”184 Again, our 
broader framing question: how does Selya know that a proposition is well 
settled and that he has accurately identified it? Selya avoids citation to 
authority for prosaic points about black-letter negligence doctrine, but he 
writes with vivid metaphor (our hypothetical supercomputer that 
quantifies fine distinctions in carelessness) to limn the general principles 
that inform his decision, i.e. jury verdict stands. Our negligence heuristic 
is a rough proxy for shared notions of causality and practical morality, and 
our standards of review reflect broader ideas about triers of fact and court 
hierarchy. These are big ideas. They are referred to elliptically and by 
example. This makes Selya’s opinion literary but not necessarily subject to 
external validation.  
Because of the epistemological problems involved in evaluating the 
unexplained first principles opinion, I argue that perfection can only be 
determined by the future audience. Levesque has since been cited by 
eleven cases and has not yet been overturned. In the language of citation 
studies, this “counts” for something. Levesque also remains a charming 
opinion; it has a jocular spirit, and it marshals this same wit to articulate 
insightful truths about the role of judge. Still, it is too self-aware to meet 
our test of effortless zen. It comments on its own use of language in a way 
that makes it feel strained.  
Time is our best judge of what endures. The first principles approach 
of the favorite opinion allows it to transcend doctrine. In addition, “the 
sparkling, vivid, memorable opinion is not so chained to the immediate 
context of its creation.”185 Because of its literary quality, it “wears best 
over time.”186 The novel metaphor does not have a provenance, and this 
helps to explain why Abrams is sparsely cited. The “marketplace of ideas” 
imagery continues to inspire productive thinking about the meaning of the 
First Amendment. With hindsight we can also unpack certain 
imperfections in this metaphor. Courts that “invoke the marketplace model 
of the first amendment justify free expression because of the aggregate 
benefits to society,” despite a plain reading that would suggest it is an 
individual right.187 We lose some precision in the contours of the First 
 
 
  184.  Selya, In Search of Less, supra note 135, at 1278. 
  185.  A STUDY IN REPUTATION, supra note 7, at 143. 
  186.  Id. 
  187.  Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in 
Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 27 (1994) (citing Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: 
A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1984)). 
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Amendment in this shift to group benefit. Favorite opinions are literary, 
but there remain core differences between legal and literary modalities of 
explaining our world. With time, the limits of metaphor can manifest.188 
X. FUTURE FAVORITES AND THE PROBLEM OF PERFECTION 
It will be interesting to observe which opinions from today become the 
favorited opinions of tomorrow. Will Justice Kennedy’s transcendental 
reflections on dignity, love and selfhood be canonized?189 Or will the 
“mad genius”190 of his first principles approach in Windsor be derided as 
specious?191 Will Judge Posner’s photographic reference to an ostrich in 
Gonzalez-Servin192 make it a fun opinion in West Publishing’s next 
iteration of Blackie the Talking Cat, or will it instead be remembered as a 
petty move to embarrass counsel for ignoring on-point precedent? These 
questions will depend on the identity of future audiences. As the 
demographics of our judges evolve to reflect the diversity of those judged, 
perhaps there will be corollary changes to our catalog of favorites. Our 
first principles depend on the tacit knowledge of the individual judge, 
which is of course informed by personal history. 
A more troubling jurisprudential question is how foreign authority and 
non-legal authority will be used and valued. Citation is an aesthetic of 
legal writing, and we expect opinions to look a certain way. It is a 
semiotics of credibility and power. But debates about the use or value of 
foreign authority, or traditionally non-legal materials like social science, 
dictionaries, or Wikipedia, are not so much about citation, but about a rule 
of recognition as to what are valid sources of authority in our legal 
culture.193 In contrast to the H.L.A. Hart position that there is a singular 
rule of recognition that determines binding authority,194 I argue that given 
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  189.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2599-2600 
(2015). 
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Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2015) (“The genius of the opinion is that it recognizes that rights 
and structure are like two interlocking gears, moving the grand constitutional project of integration 
forward.”). 
  191.  United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
  192.  Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The ostrich is a 
noble animal, but not a proper model for an appellate advocate.”).  
  193.  E.g., Schauer, Authority and Authorities, supra note 24, at 1959 (2008). 
  194.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-94 (2d ed. 1994). See also Scott 
Shapiro, What is the Rule of Recognition (and Does it Exist)?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
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the contextual nature of source-based arguments from authority, this 
singular rule is better conceived as a set of operating rules that give 
credibility to varied kinds of sources.195 These rules are socially 
constructed and reflect an interplay of novel references and perceived 
receptions to them (they are “Wittgensteinian” in this way).196 A court 
with pedigree can claim a new source of authority simply by citing to it. 
Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise share the example of how it had been 
traditionally unacceptable for English courts to cite to a living scholar.197 
Once the first English appeals court cited Arthur Goodhart, Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Oxford, in Hannah v. Peel198 the practice of citing living 
secondary authority gradually became a convention.199 Still, our 
assumption is that when a judge cites to this kind of novel secondary 
authority, or foreign or non-legal authority, that she is making the limited 
claim that these sources are useful commentary or fodder for good 
ideas.200 Not that they are law. 
When our favorite judges discern the first principles of our law, they 
are making an empirical claim that these principles underlie, and are 
integral to, our positive law. The first principles judge is not channeling an 
indiscernible “brooding omnipresence in the sky”201 but drawing on 
something autochthonic to our legal culture. 
This empirical claim can be a profound one about the meanings of 
equality (Korematsu), freedom of speech (Abrams), freedom of 
personality (Barnette) or executive power (Youngstown Steel) embedded 
in the spirit or design of our Constitution. Or it can even be the more 
modest empirical claim of black-letter doctrine (Levesque), where facile 
use of a string citation would only exacerbate the perception that our 
judges are just purveyors of pincites, our “principle asset” of the law.202 
The aesthetic choice then becomes not to cite. Selya also steps outside of 
 
 
  195.  E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 97 (“[E]very legal system rests on its laws, 
which commonly means on a set of ultimate laws of recognition and discretion”) (emphasis added). 
  196.  See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism and Legal Information, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1089 n.42 (1997).  
  197.  Id. at 1088. 
  198.  Hannah v. Peel, 1 K.B. 609 (1945). 
  199.  Id. 
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his Levesque opinion as a participant-observer and speaks first principles 
aphorisms (however banal) to announce this is a special case. For Selya, 
the very mundaneness of Levesque indicates the profundity of the 
problem: why am I required to write this? To defer to case law would not 
be wise but a rote exercise to achieve the look of judicial writing that we 
have come to expect. 
The problem is how to cabin off which “deep springs” we can refer to. 
The positivist’s claim is essentially a limited domain thesis.203 That there 
is a contained universe of valid sources of legal information, and that we 
cannot look to things that aren’t there when making legal decisions. There 
must be palpable, verifiable law. Those like Judge Posner who instead 
argue that the law is not an autonomous domain permit themselves to go 
beyond these conventional categories.204 Again we can fairly ask: who is 
allowed to go beyond, and how far can they go? Lon Fuller’s innovation 
was to construct a natural law theory within our internal morality of 
procedural norms rather than to look to extra-legal values like religion or 
the “good life” etc.205 As our legal culture evolves to consider new sources 
of authority206 and as and our world of legal information expands with the 
sprawl of our Internet search engines,207 it becomes difficult to distinguish 
legitimate unarticulated law from illegitimate unarticulated law. This is the 
epistemological problem of defining something we can’t see. It’s our old 
trope of “where do we draw the line.” 
One conclusion of this Article would seem to be that judges should 
cite less. But we should also worry that as our universe of citable authority 
expands to include new sources, the sparsely cited opinion might not rely 
on grounded principles that are sufficiently legal. Justice Breyer tells the 
story of the congressperson who tolerated Breyer’s study of foreign 
materials so long as he did not disclose this inspiration in his opinions.208 
If Breyer can still rationalize his argumentative move with reasons based 
in our own set of citable legal authorities, then he can at least maintain the 
perceived integrity of our legal system. If no prior case has been decided 
on this same foreign principle, then the congressperson’s suggestion of an 
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un-cited opinion is the more dangerous one, as we lose our grasp on our 
internalized set of first principles. At least in opinion writing, it seems that 
perfection is indeed the enemy of the good. This should make each judge 
pause before authoring an opinion without citation, even our very best 
ones.
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